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TWO EUROPEAN CONFLICTS 
CONVENTIONS 
Friedrich K Juenger * 
The states of the European Union have so far concluded two major conflict of laws conventions: 
The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, and the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.  Professor 
Juenger here reflects on the creation and experience of these treaties and concludes that the 
Brussels/Lugano Conventions present a model for the world while the Rome Convention shows what 
to avoid. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Regions that combine unity with legal diversity provide a fertile soil for the evolution of 
the conflict of laws. 1 Such conditions existed during the late Middle Ages in Upper Italy, 
where an over­arching ius commune coexisted with the city states' statuta. This configuration 
prompted glossators  and commentators, who taught Roman law ­ which they believed to be 
a timeless ratio scripta ­ but lived within city walls, to wrestle with choice of law problems. 
Undaunted by the fact that Justinian's Code failed to deal with the conflict of laws, they 
nevertheless found a place in the Corpus Juris, the lex cunctos populos, to which they appended 
their discussions of the subject. Beginning with Magister Aldricus, these medieval scholars 
created the field of  conflict of laws, about which Bartolus ultimately wrote an important 
* Edward L Barrett, Jr, Professor of Law. This article is a revised version of papers delivered on 23 
February 1998 to the New Zealand Association of Comparative Law at the Faculty of Law of the 
Victoria University of Wellington and on 16 March 1998 at a Staff Seminar at Otago University. It 
reflects prior research and conclusions developed in connection with a contribution to the Festschrift 
für Ulrich Drobnig to be published by the Hamburg Max­Planck­Institut für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht. 
1 For a brief history of the conflict of laws see F Juenger Choice of Law and Multistate and Justice (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1993) 6­42.
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commentary, out of whole cloth. Subsequently France, a monarchy the bulk of whose laws 
was  regional rather than national, provided a similarly felicitous setting. In the sixteenth 
century that country produced several distinguished conflicts writers, notably Dumoulin and 
d'Argentré. During the seventeenth century,  the Voets and Huber made important 
contributions when they wrestled with the conflicts problems of The Netherlands, a major 
trading nation whose constituent provinces were, however, fiercely independent. Later on 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny forged a conflict of laws system in Germany, then a conglomerate 
of states with a common language and usus modernus pandectarum but widely differing 
statutory and customary laws. 
In marked contrast  to the legal diversity that prevailed on the European Continent, 
England ­ where legal fragmentation had yielded to the unifying force of  the common law ­ 
contributed  nothing  to the conflict of laws before the 1707 Treaty of Union with Scotland. 
Transnational legal problems engendered by England's maritime, trading and colonising 
activities used to go to mercantile and admiralty tribunals, which applied a law merchant of 
universal purport, whilst the common law courts used to stay away from it. Initially, they 
simply dismissed actions arising out of the realm; later on judges resorted to the fiction that 
what happened abroad  had occurred in England, so that the common  law applied. Given 
Scotland's civil law tradition it is understandable that Scottish rather than English jurists ­ 
notably Lord Kames and Lord Mansfield ­ were the first contributors to the British conflict of 
laws. 2 In fact, within the common law world, the conflict of laws was rather slow to develop, 
until the subject assumed importance in the American setting, where in spite of national unity 
the bulk of the law derived from state rather than federal sources. An American judge and 
scholar, Joseph Story, who drew upon the rich continental European literature, wrote a 
landmark treatise on the subject. Demonstrating that the comparative method is not a one­ 
way street, that book, because of its intrinsic merit, became influential not only in the 
common law world but in civil law countries as well. 
The Europe of our days has witnessed the emergence of a new supranational entity, the 
European Union. Although the EU has not attained the status of a "United States of Europe", 
its quasi­federal system bears a distinct resemblance to the US, combining as it does a 
measure of economic and political unity with legal diversity. Given the intensity of 
interaction between its member states, the EU was predestined to yield initiatives in the 
2 Concerning the evolution of the Scottish conflict of laws see AE Anton and PR Beaumont Private 
International Law (2ed W Green, Edinburgh, 1990) 9­12.
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conflict of laws. What it has contributed to this field so far not only  invites comparison with 
developments in the US, but may also be of interest to other nations that have embarked on a 
course of regional economic integration. To date the EU member states have concluded two 
major conflict of laws conventions: (1) the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, and (2) the 1980 Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. Thus, the EU's member states 
­ while not codifying the entire field of conflicts law ­ have, by means of international 
compacts, dealt with all three of the subjects encompassed by the conflict of laws: 
jurisdiction, judgments recognition and choice of law. 
II JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 
A Full Faith and Credit in Europe 
Whereas the United States Constitution contains a Full Faith and Credit Clause 3 which has 
played a role in American conflicts law, 4 especially as regards the recognition of sister­state 
judgments, the European Founding Fathers failed to include a comparable provision in the 
European Community's constitutive document, the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Its article 220 
merely lists the "simplification of formalities" of judgments recognition and enforcement 
among the topics for future member states negotiations. Notwithstanding the rather limited 
purview of this provision, the committee of experts appointed to draft a convention that 
would implement the Rome Treaty's mandate construed its brief much more broadly. 
Instead of limiting their efforts to formalities, these experts  produced a remarkable 
instrument  that, in effect, supplied the ingredient that was missing in the European 
Community's constitution. Their work product, the  1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, established a system that is 
not merely comparable but superior to the practice of American courts under the Full Faith 
3 US Const article 4 section 1. 
4 "The full faith and credit clause . . . became a nationally unifying force. 
It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights 
and obligations created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by 
making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are 
given nation­wide application "Magnolia Petroleum Co v Hunt (1943) 320 US 430, 439.
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and Credit Clause. A resounding success in practical application, this "revolutionary" 5 
convention effectively created a European law of civil procedure. 6 
B Borrowing from America? 
The parallels between the Brussels Convention and US practice are sufficiently striking to 
permit the inference that the committee of experts borrowed from America. While there is no 
concrete evidence for this proposition (the committee shredded its travaux préparatoires and 
publications by its members do not mention American law as source of inspiration), it would 
be strange indeed if the European experts had entirely disdained recourse to the comparative 
method.  Some of its members were comparativists who could draw on an extensive US case 
law and literature at a time when comparatively little had been published in Europe on 
jurisdiction and judgments recognition. They could hardly have been ignorant of the 
American model when they drafted the Brussels Convention given the fact that the European 
Community's member states were then negotiating, under the auspices of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, a  judgments recognition convention. In fact, two 
members of the committee of experts also served in The Hague,  where they were surely 
exposed to American thinking on these subjects. But to the extent that the Brussels 
Convention's drafters did copy American practice, their copy is better than the original. 
C Jurisdiction 
1 American law 
The American jurisdictional law is rather less than satisfactory. 7 Since the Congress, 
though arguably empowered to do so by the Full Faith and Credit Clause,  never legislated 
on the subject,  it fell to the states to elaborate pertinent rules and principles. They enacted a 
panoply of so­called "long­arm statutes", which the highest state courts have usually 
construed in a fairly permissive manner, to subject nonresident individuals and corporations 
to the jurisdiction of domestic courts. The US Supreme Court has, however,  long claimed the 
power to subject state jurisdictional assertions to constitutional scrutiny. 8 (Surprisingly, the 
5 Droz "Entrée en vigeur de la Convention de Bruxelles concernant la compétence judiciaire et 
l'exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale" (1973) Revue critique de d.i.p. 21, 22. 
6 J Kropholler Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht (5ed Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg, 1996) 28. 
7 For critical voices see "Symposium — Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past and Future of  Personal 
Jurisdiction" (1995) 28 UC Davis L Rev 513. 
8 See Pennoyer v Neff (1877) 95 US 714.
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Court based this prerogative not on the Full Faith and Credit Clause but on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, a clause that deals with human 
rights rather than territorial constraints on state sovereignty. 9 ) In exercising its role as the 
ultimate arbiter of jurisdictional propriety, the Court has deduced from the Due Process 
(which says nothing about jurisdiction) some rather amorphous and confusing principles. It 
proclaimed that to be amenable to jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant must have certain 
"minimum contacts" with the forum state by virtue of the fact that he "purposefully availed" 
himself of the privilege of conducting activities within that state. 10 In addition, the assertion 
of jurisdiction must be fair under the circumstances. 11 Since these shibboleths are  hardly self­ 
explanatory and the Court's case law is less than pellucid, counsel, courts and even law 
professors find it difficult to fathom  the parameters of American state court jurisdiction. 
Nor do the Justices seem to be entirely sure about the meaning of their own 
pronouncements, as the numerous dissents and concurrences in jurisdictional cases show.  In 
several instances, they were unable to muster a majority on the question of  how the fluid 
concepts they devised should be applied to the facts at hand. The Supreme Court's lengthy, 
highly footnoted and frequently impenetrable opinions not only confuse bench and bar but 
they are also apt to produce questionable results. For instance, it is difficult to understand 
why elementary fairness, which the Due Process clause is designed to guarantee, should 
shield a New York father from a California action for child support brought by his daughter, 
whom he had sent to her mother in California with a one­way ticket. 12 Conversely, although 
the common law rule, that mere service within the forum state confers jurisdiction over a 
non­resident defendant, a rule the Brussels Convention blacklists, 13 can hardly be squared 
9 Whereas Justice White once argued that the Due Process Clause, "acting as an instrument of interstate 
federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment", World­Wide 
Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, (1980) 444 US 286, 294, he recanted this position in Insurance Corp of Ireland 
v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (1982) 456 US 694, 702 n10, where he somewhat incongruously 
proclaimed that the "restriction on state sovereign power described in World­Wide Volkswagen Corp. . . 
must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process 
Clause". 
10 See Hanson v Denckla (1957) 357 US 235; International Shoe Co v Washington (1945) 326 US 310. 
11 Asahi Metal Ind Co  v  Superior Court (1987) 480 US 102. 
12 See Kulko v Superior Court (1978) 436 US 84. 
13 See text preceeding n 20 below.
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with elementary notions of fairness, the Court has held such "tag jurisdiction" does not violate 
the Due Process Clause. 14 
2 The Brussels Convention 
In contrast to the welter of discordant state laws and the untidy US Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, the jurisdictional bases set forth in the Brussels Convention are fairly 
straightforward and present fewer problems in practical application. Emulating American 
Supreme Court review, the 1971 Luxembourg Protocol provides for a reference to the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities of questions concerning the interpretation of the 
Convention by domestic courts. Thus remaining uncertainties and ambiguities can be ironed 
out by the Court, which so far has rendered over a hundred decisions (unlike the US 
Supreme Court, it does not enjoy the luxury of discretionary review) that primarily clarify 
jurisdictional points, but also other issues posed by the Brussels Convention. 
The Convention's rules on jurisdiction are not only more clearly delineated; they are also 
better attuned to the protection of fundamental values. While the US Supreme Court tends to 
treat all litigants alike, the Convention is more discerning: for instance, it bestows 
jurisdictional privileges upon certain weaker parties, such as support claimants, 15 
policyholders 16 and consumers, who are allowed to sue in their home states. 17 By the same 
token, contrary to US precedent 18 the Convention severely restricts the use of forum­selection 
clauses against such parties. 19 It also prohibits the use of the exorbitant member state 
jurisdictional bases enumerated in article 3(2) of the Brussels Convention. This provision lists, 
inter alia, not only the notoriously chauvinistic article 14 of the French Civil Code (which 
allows French plaintiffs to sue anyone on any cause of action in France) and section 23 of the 
German Code of Civil Procedure (which grants German courts full in personam jurisdiction 
14 Burnham v Superior Court (1990) 495 US 604. 
15 Article 5 No 2. 
16 Article 8(1) No 2. 
17 Article 14(1). 
18 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v Shute (1991) 499 US 585. 
19 See Brussels Convention articles 12 (insurance matters), 15 (consumers), 17(5) (employment contracts).
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over nonresident defendants who own assets in Germany), but also the common law rule that 
confers jurisdiction over defendants who have been served within the forum state. 20 
D Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
With respect to the recognition and enforcement of judgments as well, the Brussels 
Convention's rules are superior to those used in American interstate practice. To be sure, in 
the US most states provide for summary procedures that eliminate the inconvenience of a 
full­fledged action on the judgment the common law used to require. But there is no quasi­ 
automatic enforcement upon a mere application (or, in the case or the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, registration) as under the Brussels Convention; 21 in the US the faith and credit a sister 
state judgments enjoy is therefore not quite as full as in the EU. The Brussels Convention's 
scheme thus represents a remarkable achievement, especially if one considers that in Europe 
judgments have to cross national frontiers rather than mere state borders and that the EU's 
member states share neither a common law nor a common language. 
E Evaluating the Brussels Convention 
This is not to say that the Brussels Convention has no flaws. The commission of experts 
left open some important issues, such as whether the place of acting, the place of injury, or 
both, have jurisdiction in tort cases. 22 For jurisdiction in contract disputes article 5 No 1 
selects the "place of performance of the obligation in question", a solution that owes more to 
Savigny's musings 23 and obsolete member state rules than sound policy. Unsurprisingly, this 
provision has caused difficulties in practical application and legal writers have called for its 
abolition. 24 More serious yet is the Convention's blatant discrimination against outsiders. 
Article 4 allows the use of exorbitant member state jurisdictional assertions (which, according 
to article 3, may no longer be invoked against EU residents) against parties domiciled outside 
20 See article 3(2), under "Ireland" and "United Kingdom". 
21 See Brussels Convention articles 31­45. 
22 See Brussels Convention article 5 No 3; Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij GJ Bier v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace 
SA (1976) ECR 1735. 
23 See FC von Savigny System des heutigen Römischen Rechts vol 8 (Veit und Comp., Leipzig 1849) 205­46. 
24 See, eg, H Gaudemet­Tallon Les Conventions de Bruxelles et de Lugano (2ed Librairie générale de droit 
et de jurisprudence, Paris 1996) 133; Droz "Delendum est forum contractus" (1997) Recueil Dalloz 
Chronique 351; Kadner, "Gerichtsstand des Erfüllungsortes im GVÜ, Einheitliches Kaufrecht und 
internationalzivilprozessrechtliche Gerechtigkeit (1997) Jura 240.
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the EU. In marked contrast, an American Supreme Court decision specifically precludes such 
discrimination and, beyond that, requires courts to consider, in passing on the fairness of 
asserting jurisdiction,  the burden imposed on nonresident individuals and enterprises who 
reside in distant countries and are unfamiliar with the forum's judicial system. 25 
But notwithstanding such deficiencies, the Brussels Convention and the Court of Justice's 
interperative endeavours nevertheless represent major progress in international procedural 
law and practice. Never in history have judgments circulated so freely among nations; never 
has international procedural law reached such heights of perfection. In three decades, 
European practice has attained a level of sophistication that is still lacking in the United States 
after more than two hundred years of experimentation. The Brussels Convention's provisions 
are, on the whole, far superior to the interstate jurisdictional and recognition practices that 
prevail in the US. Indeed, the Convention's merits are such that the progress they spell is no 
longer limited to the EU's member states: the remaining members of the European Free Trade 
Area have chosen to associate themselves with it the  by entering into the Lugano Convention 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. As for the 
rest of the world, the Brussels Conventions's regime can no doubt serve as a model for 
international procedural cooperation. 
F A Los Angeles Convention? 
In this connection it may be noted that the US is currently engaged ­ once again ­ in 
negotiating with other nations a multilateral treaty on judgments recognition under the 
auspices of  the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Regrettably, the prospects of 
such a multilateral treaty do not look particularly promising. 26 American state and federal 
courts  recognise foreign country judgments fairly liberally, 27 which reduces the incentives 
for other nations to bargain with the US. Also, the confusing and chaotic nature of American 
jurisdictional law poses obstacles to such an accord. Moreover, the fact that the  Supreme 
Court has constitutionalised the subject of jurisdiction ties the American negotiators' hands. 
Finally, one may wonder about the wisdom of negotiating about judgments recognition with 
a multitude of nations that, unlike the member states of the EU, offer neither geographic 
25 See Asahi Metal Ind Co v Superior Court 480 US 102 (1987). 
26 See Juenger "A Hague Judgments Convention?" (1998) 24 Brooklyn J Int'l L 111. 
27 For a comparative discussion of judgments recognition see Juenger "The Recognition of Money 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" (1988) 36 Am J Comp L 1.
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proximity nor common commercial policies (not to the mention considerable differences in 
their legal development). 
If  it were possible to write on a clean slate, a more expeditious way to assure the mutual 
recognition and enforcement of American and European judgments would be for the US  to 
negotiate with the EU member states, as the former  EFTA nations did, an international 
compact similar to the Lugano Convention, which might be dubbed the "Los Angeles 
Convention" (the name "New York Convention"  having been preempted by the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards). Such 
negotiations would, at the same time, offer an opportunity to remedy the defects of American 
jurisdictional law. Even beyond the transatlantic area, the Brussels and Lugano Conventions 
invite comparison and may inspire emulation; indeed, as a member of the New Zealand Bar 
has suggested the "Lugano Convention,  which takes an intelligent and coherent approach to 
these issues" might serve as a model for cross­Tasmanian judgments recognition and 
enforcement. 28 
III THE CHOICE OF LAW CONVENTION 
A Choice of Law Doctrine 
1 An academic province 
While international procedural law is far more important in practice, choice of law 
problems present a greater intellectual challenge. Much has been written about the subject 
since the glossators first discovered it, but to this day there is little agreement on even the 
most fundamental issues. In fact, one may wonder whether the rich academic literature that 
has accumulated over the centuries is of much help to judges and counsel dealing with actual 
cases.  Joseph Story, who borrowed from civilian scholars because, in his words, they had 
"examined the subject with a much more comprehensive philosophy" 29 than common 
lawyers, nevertheless criticised their "metaphysical subtleties, which perplex, if they do not 
confound, the inquirer". 30 Nor have matters improved since.  As Dean Prosser wrote: 31 
28 See Goddard, "The Changing Law of Contract ­ Problems in the Conflict of Laws" no 7 [unpublished 
paper delivered at the 1995 Journal of Contract Law Conference, on file with the author]. 
29 J Story Commentaries on the Conflict of Law (2ed A Maxwell, London, 1841) 12. 
30 Above n 29. 
31 Prosser "Interstate Publication" (1953) 51 Mich L Rev 959, 971.
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The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited 
by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and 
incomprehensible jargon.  The ordinary court or lawyer is quite lost when engulfed and entangled 
in it. 
2 The classical approach 
As this quotation suggests, choice of law, invented as it was by academicians, has 
remained under the spell of dogma. Not only the civilian but also the common law rules in 
this field are largely based on doctrinal considerations espoused by the nineteenth century 
scholar Friedrich
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Carl von Savigny, 32 who first articulated the multilateral approach to choice of law.  Savigny 
divided the body of law into broad categories (such as contracts, property and family law), 
which he linked to a given legal system by means of connecting factors (such as the place of 
transaction, the situs of a thing or the domicile of a person). In this fashion he devised a set of 
"multilateral" precepts, ie rules that evenhandedly, without forum bias, invoke either foreign 
or domestic law. By allocating every conceivable legal relationship to the jurisdiction in which 
it has its closest connection,  its "seat" or "home" as Savigny put it, 33 he created a framework 
that commends itself by virtue of its elegance and apparent simplicity. Such a system could, 
in theory, resolve any choice of law problem that might present itself and yield identical 
results in multistate cases, irrespective of the forum in which a particular dispute is 
adjudicated. 
3 Lack of uniformity 
Of course, the classical multilateral rules can achieves the goal of  "decisional harmony", 
as civilians call the avoidance of forum shopping,  only if ­ as Savigny optimistically 
predicted­ every state and nation of the world eventually adopts identical choice of law 
rules. 34 It should come as no surprise that Savigny's rather unrealistic hope was 
disappointed. Not every jurisdiction classifies its legal rules and institutions in the same 
manner, nor does each one use identical connecting factors. The resulting divergencies 
engender what civilians call the "General Part", ie that portion of the conflict of laws which is 
devoted to such  problems  as renvoi, characterisation, the incidental question and public 
policy, self­inflicted conundrums that remind us that the quest for decisional harmony is 
quite quixotic. If further evidence were needed for that proposition, a wave of recent 
continental European codifications from Portugal to Russia, as well as legislation in the 
United Kingdom, shows that Savigny's dream of worldwide conformity has been laid to rest 
even on his native continent. While the new enactments still cling to his ideal, not two of 
them are alike; they merely further balkanise European of choice of law. 
32 "[A]lthough it is true that the basis of the common law is not logic but experience, it is submitted that 
the method adopted in practice by English courts corresponds in general with that suggested by 
Savigny". PM North and JJ Fawcett Cheshire and North's Private International Law (12ed Butterworths, 
London Dublin Edinburgh 1992). 
33 FC von Savigny above n 23 at 108, 118, 120, 200. 
34 Above n 33 at 114.
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B The Convention 
1 Reasons for the Convention 
There is, however, a way ­ of which Savigny was aware 35 ­ to assure uniformity, namely 
the conclusion of choice of law treaties, which Savigny's successor Mancini advocated with 
great eloquence. Inspired by the success of the Brussels Convention, as well as  the fear that 
its panoply of  jurisdictional rules would promote forum shopping, the EU's member states 
again appointed a committee, which was to frame a choice of law convention as  "natural 
sequel" 36 to the earlier procedural compact. Among the reasons mentioned for this endeavour 
(for which the Rome Treaty offered no support) was, apart from the asserted need for 
predictability and the avoidance of forum shopping, the supposition that "the differences 
between national legal systems and the lack of unified rules of conflict definitely impede the 
free movement of persons, goods, services and capital among the Member States". 37 
After discussing the advisability of codifying, on a regional level, various  areas of choice 
of law including contracts, torts, property and the "General Part", the committee prepared a 
draft that was limited to contractual and non­contractual obligations. Once the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark acceded to what was then the European Economic 
Community, the committee further narrowed its task to contract choice of law. Its work 
product, the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Relationships, has since 
been ratified by every EU member state. However, in contrast to the practice under the 
Brussels Convention, questions relating to its interpretation cannot be referred to the Court of 
Justice; a protocol akin to the Luxembourg Protocol has so far not been ratified by a sufficient 
number of states. 
2 Contract choice of law rules 
In contract choice of law hard and fast rules of the traditional type have not played much 
of a role. To be sure, the first Conflict of Laws Restatement ordained application of the lex loci 
contractus because its Reporter, Joseph Beale, believed that the "question whether a contract is 
valid . . . can on general principle be determined by no other law than that which applies to 
35 See above n 34  at 114­15. 
36 M Giuliano and P Lagarde Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
(1980) OJ (C 282) 1, 5. 
37 Above n 36 at 4 (quoting T Vogelaar, then the Commission's Director­General for the Internal Market 
and Approximation of Legislation).
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the acts, that is, by the law of the place of contracting". 38 In practical application, however, 
the lex loci contractus rule is highly unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. It causes problems 
whenever the parties to an agreement deal with each other across state lines by mail, 
telephone or some other means of communication, because it is often difficult to determine 
which act constitutes the offer and which the acceptance that completes the agreement. Even 
if the parties are present in the same state, the locus contractus may be entirely  fortuitous,  for 
instance, if they reach agreement in an airplane.  Equally unsatisfactory is the lex loci 
solutionis. A contract usually imposes several obligations, not all of which are necessarily 
performed in the same state, so that several different laws would govern one and the same 
agreement. 
3 Party autonomy 
Instead of relying on choice of law rules of the traditional type courts, deferring to the 
substantive policy of freedom of contract, allow enterprises and individuals to stipulate the 
law they wish to govern their bargain. The principle of party autonomy is quite old; it 
probably predates Dumoulin, to whom it is customarily attributed. In the common law it 
prompted the famous dictum of Lord Mansfield that the governing law is that with a view to 
which the contract was made. 39 This principle is of course incompatible with the classical 
system, which relies on value­free multilateral rules rather than substantive policy 
considerations. In fact, not only Beale but civilian scholars as well disparaged the idea that the 
parties, rather than multilateral conflicts rules of the traditional type, determine what law 
governs a contract. In Europe and elsewhere, however, courts, unperturbed by such 
scholarly scruples and cognizant of the fact that party autonomy guaranties "decisional 
harmony" far better than any hard and fast choice of law rule could, readily enforce choice of 
law clauses. Accordingly, it needed  no convention to make  this principle a fundamental 
tenet of contract choice of law in the EU. 
Article 3 of the Rome Convention acknowledges this principle and clarifies a few details. 
Thus, according to article 3(1), second sentence, the choice of a particular law may be inferred 
from the terms of the contract; according to the third sentence, a dépeçage effect can be 
achieved by making a choice with respect to only part of the agreement; and article 3(2) 
permits a choice that changes the originally applicable law. More importantly, articles 5 and 6 
38 J Beale A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws vol 2 (Baker Voorhis and Co, New York, 1935) 1091. 
39 "[T]he general rule [that the lex loci contractus governs]. . . . admits of an exception when the parties . . . 
had a view to a different kingdom". Robinson v Bland (1760) 1 Wm Bl 234, 258­59.
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restrict party autonomy as regards consumer and employment contracts, and articles 3(3) and 
(7) restrict the parties' power to stipulate out of certain "mandatory rules". Implicitly, though 
not expressis verbis, the Convention imposes yet another important constraint on party 
autonomy: according to one of the  Reporters, the Convention does not authorise the parties 
to choose a non­positive law (such as the lex mercatoria or the UNDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts) but only the law of some state or nation. 40 
4 Law applicable in the absence of choice 
(a)  Presumed intent 
But what if a contract makes no provision for the applicable law? It may seem obvious 
that there is no room for party autonomy whenever  the parties have failed to avail 
themselves of the power to designate the law they wish to govern. Dumoulin and Lord 
Mansfield, however,  shared the opinion that the parties' choice need not be express; a mere 
implied or presumed intent should also be honoured, a proposition with which the US 
Supreme Court agreed at one time. 41 Ever since d'Argentré derided this "mirificum Molinaei 
acumen", the notion of presumed intent has been recognised for what it is: a mere fiction. But, 
like others, this fiction has a  benign effect. When thinking about what the contracting parties 
would have wished, had they only wished, judges can be expected to choose the law they 
believe ought to govern the particular agreement. Specifically, since the parties cannot 
reasonably be presumed to have intended to select a law that would invalidate their contract, 
the fiction of  a pactum tacitum amounts, in effect, to a rule of validation. 
(b) The "closest connection" 
The drafters of the Rome Convention, however, rejected this subjective approach. Whilst 
article 3(1), as noted earlier, allows judges to infer a choice of the applicable law from the 
terms of an agreement, the Convention precludes them from to honouring a mere implied 
intent. The committee of experts, preferring objective criteria 42 to the pseudo­psychological 
notion of a hypothetical intent, opted for a pseudo­geographical  connecting factor: according 
to article 4(1),  the law of the country with which the contract is "most closely connected" 
controls if the parties 
40 Lagarde "Le nouveau droit international privé des contrats après l'entrée en vigeur de la Convention de 
Rome du 19 juin 1980" (1991) Revue critique de d.i.p. 287, 300­301. 
41 Pritchard v Norton (1882) 106 US 124. 
42 See Giuliano and Lagarde above n 36 at 19.
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fail to make a choice. This rather vague criterion 43 is akin to the English  "closest and most 
real connection" and the American "most significant relationship" 44 mantras. Although it is 
less obviously teleological than the notion of "presumed intent", it still encourages judicial 
creativity because its indeterminacy confers a measure of discretion that allows judges to 
emphasise those contacts that lead to the law they wish to apply, eg that which validates the 
agreement. 
(c) The "characteristic performance" 
Judicial discretion, however, was something that the Rome Convention's framers did not 
cherish; they preferred more rigid connecting factors of the kind traditionally used in 
multilateral rules.  While realising the problematic nature of such contacts as the place of 
contracting or performance, they tried nevertheless to give "specific form and objectivity to 
this, in itself, too vague concept of 'closest connection'". 45 To that end, they opted for a novel 
connecting factor.   According to article 4(2), first sentence,  it is  presumed that a contract is 
most closely connected "with the country where the party who is to effect the performance 
which is characteristic of the contract has . . . his habitual residence, or, in the case of a body 
corporate or unincorporate, its central administration". By choosing the performing party's 
home state rather than the place of performance, the drafters avoided application of a law 
whose connection with the agreement may be entirely fortuitous; by privileging one 
particular performance, they avoided the application of more than one law. 
Whether the concept of "characteristic performance"  has much to commend itself may 
well be doubted. In many cases ­ such as in contracts to publish a book or  barter agreements 
­ the concept does not work at all.  Where it does work, that connecting factor confers an 
unwarranted choice of law privilege on those parties who professionally offer goods or 
services in the world market: according to article 4(2) these enterprises are entitled to have 
their home state law applied. As anyone who negotiates international contracts knows, 
application on one's own law is usually considered to be a definite advantage, for which a 
party must normally  bargain and offer some quid pro quo. Finally, the added measure of 
43 According to René David "The International Unification of Private Law" in International Encyclopedia 
of Comparative Law vol 2 (JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen Mouton The Hague Paris, Oceana 
Publications Inc New York (1971) ch 5 at 8 "this formula means nothing except, perhaps, that the 
answer is not ready at hand". 
44 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws s 188(1) (1971). 
45 Giuliano and Lagarde above n 36 at 21.
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certainty the characteristic performance test is supposed to safeguard is undercut by article 
4(5), according to which this criterion "shall be disregarded if it appears from the 
circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country". 
By referring to "the circumstances as a whole", article 4(5) reintroduces the very discretion 
that article 4(2) was supposed to curtail. 
C A Model for Other Nations? 
Quite apart from its defects, one may well question whether the Rome Convention was 
really necessary. The fact that member states of the European Union may have different 
contract choice of law rules hardly impedes trade and commerce among them, as had been 
asserted in support of this project. 46 In the US, for instance, where the approaches to contract 
choice of law range from interest analysis to the hoary place­of­contracting rule, 47 these 
disparities  have had no appreciable effect on the free movement of persons, goods, and 
services within that country.  Also, whatever is good about the Rome Convention ­ such as 
party autonomy ­ it  is not new, and whatever is new ­ such as the characteristic performance 
test ­ is not good. Because contracts are the lifeblood of international trade and commerce, the 
choice of law problems they engender require result­oriented pragmatism rather than faithful 
adherence to  dogma. 48 For this reason the framers of an inter­American contract choice of 
law convention negotiated under the auspices of the Organisation of American States 
specifically rejected several of the Rome Convention's salient features. 49 Instead of relying 
exclusively on objective contacts, the Mexico City Convention left room for the finding of a 
"presumed intent"; it specifically authorised the choice of a non­positive law; and it 
deliberately omitted the "characteristic performance" test. 
46 See above text accompanying n 37. 
47 For a recent listing of  the contract choice of law approaches various American states follow see 
Symeonides "Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996: Tenth Annual Survey" (1997) 45 Am J 
Comp L 447, 460. 
48 The drafts produced by the committee of experts "as well as the accompanying legal discussion . . . 
were, as far as argumentation and methods are concerned, rooted in classical private international 
law". Basedow, Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europäischen Binnenmarkt: 
favor referentis (1995) 59 Rabels Z 1, 3. 
49 Concerning the Mexico City Convention see Juenger "The Inter­American Convention on the Law 
Applicable to International Contracts" (1994) 42 Am J Comp L 381.
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IV CONCLUSION 
One of the two European conflicts conventions is exemplary,  the other of questionable 
value. Whereas the drafters of the procedural compact took a pragmatic and result­oriented 
stance, those who wrote the Rome Convention failed to pay sufficient attention to substantive 
policy considerations and common sense solutions. Doctrinal considerations and 
"metaphysical subtleties" rather than the exigencies of international commerce prevailed; 
preoccupied with conflicts dogma and the ever­elusive quest for "decisional harmony", the 
drafters paid too little attention to practicalities. As a result, the Brussels/Lugano 
Conventions laid the foundation for a international law of civil procedure, whereas the Rome 
Convention does little to promote the emergence of a much needed European contracts law. 
Thus the Brussels/Lugano Conventions  present a model for the world; the Rome Convention 
shows what other nations should avoid. 
DEUX CONVENTIONS EUROPÉENNES DE RÉSOLUTIONS DE CONFLITS DE LOI 
Les pays de l'Union Européenne ont conclu deux importantes conventions de résolutions 
de conflits de lois.  La premiére dite Convention de Bruxelles de 1968 sur la compétence 
judiciaire et l'exécution des jugements, et la seconde dite Convention de Rome de 1980 sur la 
loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles.  L'auteur évoque la genèse de ces conventions et 
à  la lumiére de leur mise en oeuvre, précise quelle leur portée réelle.
